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SUSPENSE		1 Oct 88 Date			

Remarks

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[Signature] Executive Secretary

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Date

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
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

88-3164X

IN REPLY REFER TO
Ser 092/8S528827
15 August 1988

SECRET - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure

26 AUG 1988



From: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-092)
To: Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Subj: SUBMARINE/ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE NET ASSESSMENT

1011-7-SE


Ref: (a) House Appropriations Committee Report on FY89
Defense Appropriation

Encl: (1) Proposed Net Assessment Outline

1. Reference (a) directed the development and submission of a net assessment of U. S. and Soviet submarine and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces in the year 2000. The assessment is to consider both the projected threat and the technologically feasible threat at that time. The House Appropriations Committee report further directed that the assessment be "coordinated and led by the Director of Naval Intelligence. . ."

2. The planning and development process for the requested net assessment has begun. Integral to this assessment will be your views of Soviet capabilities. I, therefore, request your preparation of a projected and technologically feasible threat assessment of Soviet submarine and ASW forces in the year 2000. It is intended that the net assessment will be complete in November 1988, so your assessment is required by 1 October 1988. An outline of the proposed net assessment is provided as enclosure (1). It is requested that your input concentrate on the technical factors identified in Section V of the outline.

3. Your assistance in developing this net assessment is greatly appreciated. My point of contact in Naval Intelligence Command is Miss Karen L. Evans, NTIC-DE20, 763-1669 or Gray 970-6161.


THOMAS A. BROOKS
Director of Naval
Intelligence
RADM, USN

PROPOSED OUTLINE:

SUBMARINE/ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE NET ASSESSMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

This section contains a brief description of the background for developing this assessment, the data used and the organizations participating in its development.

II. SCOPE

This section describes the scope of the assessment which focuses on Soviet ASW against U. S. submarines and U. S. ASW against Soviet submarines. Non-ASW missions for submarines are not included in the assessment.

III. DEFINITION OF TERMS

This section describes the basic terms used throughout the assessment and gives definitions for the technical, operational and strategic terms associated with the study and conduct of antisubmarine warfare.

IV. STRATEGIC FACTORS

This section will contrast U. S. Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) plans and strategies with those of the Soviet Union. The section will include discussions of the following topics:

- Strategy and doctrinal considerations
- Perceived and actual warfare requirements
- Soviet perceptions of Allied contributions
- Correlation of forces
- Force levels and readiness
- SALT/START implications
- INF offsets
- Strategic cruise missile platform impacts
- Protracted conventional war implications

V. TECHNICAL AND SYSTEMS FACTORS

This section will compare the technical and systems capabilities of the Soviet Union and the U. S. for both projected and technologically feasible capabilities. Topics to be considered in this section are:

- Submarine quieting

ENCLOSURE (1)

PROPOSED OUTLINE:

SUBMARINE/ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE NET ASSESSMENT (CONT.)

V. TECHNICAL AND SYSTEMS FACTORS (CONT.)

- Countermeasures, including:
 - Active acoustic cancellation
 - Minimizing acoustic vulnerabilities
 - Offboard deception
 - Ship-deployed decoys
 - Active target strength reduction
- ASW Platform Systems, including:
 - Submarines (communications, signal processing, automation, sensors, survivability, propulsion, hull design)
 - Aircraft (active and passive sonobuoys, dipping sonars)
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VI. OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL FACTORS

This section will contrast the operational and tactical impacts on force and mission effectiveness for both U. S. and Soviet submarines and ASW forces. The section will estimate the potential for mission success given the above strategic and technical factors and considering the operational impacts of tactical experience and scenario dependence.

VII. NET ASSESSMENT

Given the discussions of all of the above factors, this section will summarize the overall assessment of relative U. S. and Soviet submarine and ASW force superiority.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

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MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

Subj: SUBMARINE/ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE NET ASSESSMENT

Ref: (a) House Appropriations Committee Report on FY89
Defense Appropriation

Encl: (1) Proposed Net Assessment Outline

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2. Request each of you identify a point of contact and begin developing your portion of the required assessment of U. S. submarine and ASW force capabilities in the year 2000. The target date for completion of the net assessment is November 1988, so all submissions should be received by 1 October 1988. The OP-081/OP-092 net assessment team will coordinate with each of you as the net assessment is completed.

3. Request that the name of your action officer be forwarded to Miss Karen L. Evans, the OP-092 point of contact for coordination and Red force inputs; she can be reached at 763-1669. The OP-081 point of contact for Blue force inputs is CAPT Linton Wells, at 697-5288/5295.

Distribution:

OP-02
OP-03
OP-05
OP-07
OP-098
COMSPAWARSCOM

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350

IN REPLY REFER TO

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Subj: SUBMARINE/ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE NET ASSESSMENT (U)

Ref: (a) House Appropriations Committee Report on FY89
Defense Appropriation

Encl: (1) Proposed Approach: Submarine/ASW Net Assessment (U)

1. (U) Reference (a) directed the development and submission of a net assessment of U. S. and Soviet submarine and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces in the year 2000. The assessment is to consider both the projected threat and the technologically feasible threat during that time period.

2. (U) The House Appropriations Committee report directed that the assessment be "coordinated and led by the Director of Naval Intelligence...." The Office of Naval Intelligence is not chartered or equipped to perform net assessments and the Navy Office of Net Assessments has only recently been established in OP-081. Therefore, in order to satisfactorily respond to the Committee direction, it is proposed that the Office of Net Assessments and the Office of Naval Intelligence combine resources to produce the requested net assessment.

3. (U) It is proposed that the House Appropriations Committee request be satisfied with a briefing which summarizes the results of the comprehensive studies conducted by the Navy over the past several years. The outline of the briefing and the strategy for compiling and developing the content of the briefing are outlined in enclosure (1).

4. (S) The language in the classified Committee report annex focuses concern on past Navy practices of having net assessments of major systems conducted by the program offices responsible for the total systems development effort. The Navy briefing will endeavor to present a factual assessment, fully coordinated throughout the Navy for Blue force projections and with the Intelligence Community for intelligence inputs. The results will be coordinated through

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Subj: SUBMARINE/ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE NET ASSESSMENT (U)

the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff net assessment offices. It is intended that the presentation on submarine and ASW forces will be broad in scope, considering possible capabilities and geopolitical factors which could potentially degrade the effectiveness of U. S. submarine forces and tactical and strategic ASW assets over the next 12 years.

5. (U) Because the House Appropriations Committee has requested that the Navy response be provided at the time of the POM 90 budget submission, the actual briefing will probably not take place until February 1989. The assessment will, therefore, accurately reflect the Navy's program as represented by the POM submission. The intent is to have a short paper and the comprehensive briefing completed by November 1988 so that appropriate OPNAV, Navy, Joint Chiefs and Defense approvals can be obtained.

PROPOSED APPROACH:

SUBMARINE/ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE NET ASSESSMENT

PURPOSE

- To propose a strategy and plan of action and milestones (POA&M) through which the Navy Office of Net Assessment and the Office of Naval Intelligence will jointly satisfy the House Appropriations Committee request for a Submarine/Antisubmarine Warfare net assessment.

NAVY NET
ASSESSMENTS

- From 1983 until the recent establishment of OP-081 as the Navy's Net Assessment Office, there was not a single point of contact within OPNAV to support the development of net assessments. They have, for the most part, been conducted under the auspices of major program managers for specific development programs, thus leading to the Congressional dissatisfaction with Navy's methods.
- With the above history in mind, the requested net assessment will be a joint effort on the part of OP-08 and OP-092, joining the office formally charged with producing Navy Net Assessments with the Office of Naval Intelligence who has been directed by the House Appropriations Committee to develop this product.

PROPOSED
STRATEGY

- The proposed strategy is to satisfy the Congressional request with a briefing and short summary paper vice a detailed, high intensity, documented study.
- The proposed strategy has several key features.
 - The assessment will focus on submarines and antisubmarine warfare (ASW), e.g., Soviet ASW against U. S. submarines and U. S. ASW against Soviet submarines. Based on the language in the classified HAC report annex, it appears the major concern is the range of uncertainty in the threat, particularly as it relates to requirements for new U. S. submarines.

ENCLOSURE (1)

-- Early in the process, we will request assistance and guidance from the Secretary of Defense office involved with net assessments. It is intended that the briefing resulting from this effort will be approved by both SECDEF and OJCS organizations.

-- National Intelligence Community contributions to the intelligence input (Red assessment) will be requested early in the process.

-- The assessment itself will be documented in a short summary paper suitable as an executive summary, with copies of the briefing materials as appendices.

-- The process of developing the net assessment briefing will be one requiring total Navy involvement. While OP-08 is chartered for this activity and OP-092 has been directed to produce the current study of interest, both organizations will rely heavily on OP-02/03/05/06/07 for substantive input to and critical review of the product.

- The strategy will be implemented in the following fashion:

-- Key individuals within OPNAV and Naval Intelligence Command will be identified who will contribute to the assessment.

-- Each organization identified as having a major supporting role in this effort shall bring to a central collation point all substantive documentation on Blue capabilities, vulnerabilities and operational characteristics. OP-092 will provide the appropriate Red assessment with coordinated inputs from the Intelligence Community.

-- From the known collection of information, the key team members will identify those areas in which data is incomplete or for which documentation is unavailable. A determination will be made through which those information gaps will be filled.

-- Team members shall coordinate filling any technical or operational gaps. Key members will compile all available documentation into a summary paper which will be the documentary basis for the briefing.

-- The briefing will be developed based on geopolitical, technical and operational considerations. The projected threat and the technologically feasible threat will be treated individually in the summary paper and briefing. The briefing will be broad in scope, touching on most of the potential adversary capabilities which could be developed, while not focusing on any particular technologies in great detail.

- The briefing and summary paper will be developed based on the outline and topic guidance provided in Attachment A.

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ATTACHMENT A

PROPOSED OUTLINE:

SUBMARINE/ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE NET ASSESSMENT (CONT.)

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